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Abstract	
In	this	paper	we	develop	a	socio-technical	analysis	of	the	European	electricity	system.	We	
show	that	the	relationship	between	high	level	grand	visions	of	an	integrated	European	
system	and	more	pragmatic	bottom-up	processes	of	electricity	system	development	have	
been	a	feature	of	the	European	regime	for	coordinating	cross-border	electricity	flows	since	
the	1920s.	Following	a	period	when	radically	different	visions	of	a	European	system	were	
proposed,	the	nation-state	emerged	as	the	key	site	of	system	building	and	constituted	the	
core	of	the	technological	and	institutional	configuration.	However,	European	grand	visions	
persisted	and	this	led	to	the	creation	of	various	forms	of	transnational	collaboration	and	
coordination.	We	discuss	whether	this	inherited	technical	and	institutional	configuration	is	
compatible	with	the	contemporary	desire	for	a	European	low	carbon	transition	and	we	
emphasise	the	need	for	more	detailed	analysis	of	socio-technical	regimes	and	their	
dynamics	to	inform	policy	and	enrich	transitions	theory.	
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1 Introduction	
This	paper	develops	a	historical	perspective	on	the	relationship	between	a	European	
internal	electricity	market	(IEM)	and	national	energy	policy	responses	to	the	
decarbonisation	agenda.	While	much	of	the	recent	debate	and	discussion	about	European	
energy	and	climate	policy	is	focused	on	more	integrated	energy	and	climate	policy	in	the	EU,	
it	tends	to	be	conducted	without	recognition	of	the	history	of	multi-level	alignments	and	
tensions	between	pan-European	and	(sub-)	national	electricity	governance.	In	this	paper	we	
show	that	the	relationship	between	high	level	grand	visions	of	an	integrated	European	
system	and	more	pragmatic	bottom-up	processes	of	electricity	system	development	
primarily	initiated	at	the	national	level	have	been	a	feature	of	the	European	system	since	
the	concept	was	first	proposed	in	the	1920s.	Drawing	on	socio-technical	systems	theory,	we	
show	that	the	European	electricity	regime	for	coordinating	cross-border	flows	was	shaped	
through	the	evolution	of	this	relationship.	At	times	during	the	period	we	analyse,	from	the	
1920s	to	the	present	day,	the	relative	emphasis	has	been	on	the	national	or	the	pan-
European,	and	there	have	been	periods	of	tension	and	synergy	between	them.		
The	paper	is	written	with	a	view	to	providing	historical	depth	to	the	current	tension	at	the	
heart	of	European	energy	policy.	Despite	the	efforts	of	the	European	Union	(EU)	in	creating	
a	harmonised	approach	to	decarbonisation2,	electricity	system	transition	has	largely	been	
pursued	at	the	nation-state	level	through	regulatory	interventions	and	policies,	and	as	a	
result	has	been	an	uneven	process.	This	unevenness	is	illustrated	in	figure	1	below	which	
shows	the	deployment	of	renewables	in	the	electricity	systems	of	a	selected	number	of	
European	countries.	While	there	are,	for	example,	some	signs	of	convergence	between	
Germany	and	the	UK,	the	general	picture	is	that	countries	have	had	different	starting	points	
and	are	moving	at	different	speeds	in	terms	of	their	low	carbon	transitions,	exemplified	for	
example	by	the	rapid	growth	of	large	scale	wind	power	in	the	UK	in	recent	years.	This	
differential	growth	in	renewables	deployment	is	largely	as	a	result	of	national-level	policies	
such	as	feed-in	tariffs,	capacity	auctions	and	tradable	certificates,	rather	than	driven	by	pan-
European	energy	and	carbon	price	signals.	
	
																																																						
2	Primarily	through	its	two	agreements	it	has	set	EU-wide	targets	for	decarbonisation.	A	reduction	in	
greenhouse	gas	emissions	of	at	least	20%	by	2020	agreed	in	2008	(Energy	and	Climate	Package)	and	40%	by	
2030	agreed	in	2014	(Energy	and	Climate	Framework),	both	from	1990	levels.	
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Figure	1:	Renewables	deployment	in	selected	European	countries.	Data	from	
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/energy/data/shares		
The	process	described	above	has	resulted	in	a	divergence	between	countries	as	they	pursue	
different	policy	measures	and	low	carbon	transition	pathways,	leading	to	what	some	
commentators	have	referred	to	as	a	‘re-nationalisation	of	energy	policy’	in	Europe	(Buchan	
and	Keay,	2016a).	This	is	a	key	concern	of	proposals	to	reform	electricity	market	governance	
contained	in	the	EU’s	2016	‘Winter	Package’	of	proposals.3			
The	paper	has	two	main	aims.	Firstly,	to	develop	an	understanding	of	the	historical	origins	
of	this	key	tension	between	high-level	visions	of	a	single	and	seamless	European	system	of	
electricity	flows,	and	more	pragmatic	processes	of	system	building	primarily	located	at	the	
national	level.	This	is	with	a	view	to	informing	contemporary	policy	debates	about	market	
design,	the	integration	of	renewables	and	the	relationship	between	different	levels	and	
scales	of	electricity	system	governance	in	Europe.	The	dynamic	between	grand	visions	and	
pragmatic	integration,	we	argue,	provides	a	useful	conceptual	lens	through	which	to	analyse	
key	continuities	which	have	shaped	the	European	style4	of	electricity	integration.	We	show	
how	over	the	decades	the	rules	governing	cross-border	electricity	flows	in	Europe	emerged	
as	an	outcome	of	a	complex	political	configuration	where	jurisdiction	over	the	operation	of	
the	technical	systems	largely	resided	at	the	national	level,	but	transnational	organisations	
such	as	the	European	Commission	and	various	industry	and	regulatory	coordination	bodies	
have	exerted	an	important	influence.		
Our	second	aim	is	to	develop	and	extend	the	socio-technical	systems	approach	to	the	
analysis	of	electricity	integration	and	low	carbon	transition	in	a	European	policy	context.	
Much	of	the	current	research	on	European	electricity	integration	is	based	on	techno-
economic	appraisals	of	the	economic	benefits	of	integration,	which	typically	downplay	the	
complex	political	and	institutional	challenges	involved	in	large	scale	system	change.	We	
draw	on	the	regime	concept	developed	in	the	sustainability	transitions	literature	(Markard	
et	al.,	2012)	to	open	up	our	understanding	of	the	interplay	between	technologies	and	
institutions	in	the	shaping	of	the	European	electricity	system.	Regimes,	broadly	defined,	are	
																																																						
3	https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/commission-proposes-new-rules-consumer-centred-clean-energy-
transition		
4	We	draw	here	from	Thomas	Hughes	(1983).	He	used	the	concept	of	technological	style	to	denote	a	specific	
way	of	using	and	institutionalising	electricity	within	a	particular	cultural,	geographical	and	political	context.	
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the	rules	which	provide	stability	to	large	technological	systems	such	as	electricity	supply	
(Geels,	2011,	Steward,	2012).	They	are	held	together	and	gain	stability	from	mutually	
reinforcing	interactions	between	technologies	and	institutions	and	tend	to	change	only	over	
long	timescales,	therefore	a	historical	approach	is	required	in	order	to	understand	their	
characteristics	and	evolution.	This	in	turn	enables	contemporary	policy	debates	about	
regime	transitions	to	be	contextualised	and,	crucially,	the	influence	of	historical	continuities	
to	be	uncovered	and	explored.	A	key	aim	of	socio-technical	systems	research	has	been	to	
understand	the	processes	through	which	technologies	and	institutions	become	intertwined;	
these	typically	remain	hidden	in	contemporary	policy	debates,	but	have	been	shown	to	be	
highly	influential	in	processes	of	electricity	system	change	(David	and	Bunn,	1988,	Unruh,	
2000).		
The	remainder	of	the	paper	is	structured	as	follows:	In	the	next	section	we	outline	our	
analytical	approach	which,	as	mentioned	above,	is	based	on	socio-technical	systems	theory,	
and	in	particular	the	analysis	of	regimes	and	transitions.	We	discuss	how	socio-technical	
regimes	and	their	dynamics	have	been	conceptualised	in	different	strands	of	this	literature.	
Following	this,	we	outline	how	our	approach	to	the	analysis	of	the	European	electricity	
regime	contributes	to	recent	debates	in	this	field,	in	particular	about	the	role	of	regimes	and	
incumbent	actors	in	innovation	processes.	We	pay	particular	attention	to	Van	Der	Vleuten	
and	Högselius’	call	for	a	‘symmetrical’	approach	to	transitions	analysis	which	stresses	the	
ability	of	regimes	to	adapt	to	uncertainty	and	disruptions,	and	the	need	for	openness	to	
both	incumbent	and	niche-led	innovation	processes	(Van	Der	Vleuten	and	Högselius,	2012).	
Following	this	we	begin	the	empirical	study	by	outlining	how	the	European	regime	
governing	cross-border	electricity	flows	has	been	influenced	and	shaped	by	interactions	and	
tensions	between	national	and	transnational	level	drivers	of	change	in	three	periods.	The	
first	examines	the	early	period	of	European	electricity	integration,	beginning	with	the	inter-
war	years	when	many	grand	visions	were	proposed,	and	continuing	into	to	the	post-war	era	
when	pragmatic	integration	around	core	national	systems	was	established.	Rather	than	the	
creation	of	an	integrated	European	system,	this	period	saw	the	emergence	of	an	embryonic	
market	as	a	means	of	linking	national	systems.	In	the	second	we	outline	how	the	European	
market,	which	became	established	in	the	2000s,	has	been	orientated	around	a	new	market-
based	grand	vision,	the	design	of	which	incorporated	important	features	of	the	earlier	
pragmatic	integration	approach.	Through	this	analysis	we	can	discern	a	distinctive	style	of	
electricity	integration,	where	national	systems	form	the	core	and	the	European	system	is	
constituted	by	a	higher	level	layer	of	exchange	and	trading	which	has	been	built	up	between	
these	national	systems.	The	third	is	the	contemporary	period.	Here	discuss	how	the	
interaction	of	the	market	and	low	carbon	agendas	are	creating	tensions	in	this	regime	
alignment	and	we	discuss	key	responses	and	reforms	which	have	been	proposed	by	the	EU	
Commission	in	order	to	address	these.	In	the	final	section	we	discuss	our	findings	in	relation	
to	contemporary	policy	debates	and	how	our	work	contributes	to	an	understanding	of	
European	low	carbon	transitions.	
2 Analytical	approach	
2.1 Socio-technical	regime	analysis	
The	basis	of	the	socio-technical	approach	is	that	large	technical	systems,	such	as	electricity	
supply,	are	composed	of	interactions	and	inter-relationships,	both	between	different	
technical	artefacts	as	part	of	complex	technical	systems,	and	between	technical	and	non-
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technical	components,	such	as	laws,	regulations,	and	economic	frameworks	(Hughes,	
1983)(Mitchell,	2008).	Such	systems,	by	their	nature,	engender	continuity	as	they	are	
composed	of	a	complex	set	of	interlocking	and	mutually	reinforcing	social	and	technical	
components;	what	Thomas	Hughes	referred	to	as	the	“seamless	web”.	Concepts	such	as	
technological	momentum	(Hughes,	1983),	techno-institutional	complexes	and	lock-in	
(Unruh,	2000),	path	dependency	(David	and	Bunn,	1988),	and	regimes	(Nelson	and	Winter,	
1977)	have	all	been	used	to	describe	the	tendency	towards	continuity	in	technical	systems.		
The	issue	of	continuity	and	system	change	has	recently	been	addressed	in	work	in	the	
sustainability	transitions	field	(Smith	et	al.,	2010,	Markard	et	al.,	2012).	Rather	than	focusing	
on	how	systems	emerge,	grow	and	become	embedded	in	society,	as	was	largely	(though	not	
exclusively)	the	case	in	earlier	work	on	large	technological	systems	(LTS)	(Coutard,	1999,	
Ewertsson	and	Ingelstam,	2004,	van	der	Vleuten,	2004,	Mayntz	and	Hughes,	1988,	Kaijser	
and	Hedin,	1995),	the	emphasis	is	on	processes	which	lead	to	fundamental	changes	in	
established	regimes,	for	example	through	fragmentation	or	decline.	Regimes	in	this	
literature	are	the	“the	semi-coherent	set	of	rules	that	orient	and	coordinate	the	activities	of	
the	social	groups	that	reproduce	the	various	elements	of	socio-technical	systems”	(Geels,	
2011:	p.	27).	A	transition	is	the	shift	from	one	regime	type	to	another,	a	process	which	is	
conceptualised	by	scholars	in	this	field	by	using	a	multi-level	perspective	(MLP)	involving	
landscapes,	regimes	and	niches:	Regimes	can	be	destabilised	by	radical	innovations	which	
are	developed	by	innovators	in	micro-level	niches	and	also	by		macro-level	external	
landscape	effects,	like	warfare	or	oil	crises,	which	are	beyond	the	direct	influence	of	regime	
and	niche	level	actors.	While	the	LTS	literature	concentrated	on	the	early	stages	of	
technological	development	and	the	role	of	system	builders,	the	MLP	approach	is	more	
attuned	to	dynamic	interactions	between	radical	innovations,	external	landscape	effects	
and	incumbent	regimes.	
Many	of	the	early	contributions	to	the	MLP	literature	focused	on	innovation	processes	at	
the	niche	level	and	on	disruptive	patterns	of	system	change	(Kemp	et	al.,	1998,	Hoogma	et	
al.,	2002).	However,	more	recently	the	analysis	of	regime	level	dynamics	and	the	role	of	
incumbents	has	begun	to	feature	more	in	this	literature	(Bolton	et	al.,	2016).	This	line	of	
research	was	opened	up	following	criticisms	of	a	“niche	bias”	in	transitions	research.	In	MLP	
terminology,	a	lack	of	attention	to	the	“adaptive	capacity”	of	regimes	in	the	face	of	
disruptive	change	from	the	niche	and	landscape	levels	(Berkhout	et	al.,	2004).	MLP	scholars	
(Geels	and	Schot	(2007)	responded	to	this	criticism	by	proposing	a	more	varied	set	of	
potential	transition	pathways	based	on	interactions	between	the	three	levels.	This	typology	
incorporates	more	scope	for	regime	agency	during	transition	processes;	for	example,	in	a	
transformation	path:	“new	regimes	grow	out	of	old	regimes	through	cumulative	
adjustments	and	reorientations”;	while	during	a	reproduction	process	“accumulated	
incremental	innovations”	enable	regimes	to	slowly	adapt	to	moderate	external	pressures	for	
change.	Following	on	from	this	largely	theoretical	discussion	of	transition	mechanisms	and	
typologies,	a	number	of	empirical	studies	have	illustrated	how	incumbents	engage	in	both	
incremental	and	radical	innovation	(Bergek	et	al.,	2013,	Ottosson	and	Magnusson,	2013)	
and	have	discussed	the	implications	for	“continuity-based”	system	change	for	energy	
innovation	policy	(Winskel	and	Radcliffe,	2014).		
Historians	of	technology	Erik	Van	Der	Vleuten	and	Per	Högselius	have	developed	an	
empirical	approach	to	regime	analysis	which	is	particularly	relevant	to	both	this	debate	and	
our	study	of	European	electricity	(Van	Der	Vleuten	and	Högselius,	2012).	They	criticise	what	
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they	regard	an	overly	mechanistic	multi-level	approach	in	transition	studies	for	
overemphasising	dis-continuities,	external	sources	of	system	change,	and	for	not	taking	into	
account	the	capacity	of	incumbent	actors	to	incrementally	adapt	to	and	even	shape	change	
in	accordance	with	their	capacities	and	economic	interests.	Drawing	on	historical	evidence	
of	transnational	gas	and	electricity	regimes	in	Europe,	they	make	the	case	for	a	
“symmetrical”	approach	which	considers	how	regimes	develop	and	change	through	both	
radical	and	incremental	forms	of	innovation	and	system	change.		
Building	a	case	for	a	transnational	perspective	on	transitions,	and	studying	the	evolving	
European	electricity	and	gas	infrastructures,	their	work	makes	three	key	additions	to	
existing	transitions	theory.	Firstly,	the	incumbents	at	the	European	scale	are	not	only	
resisting	change.	To	various	degrees,	European	energy	producers,	users,	and	regulators	also	
pushed	for	change,	whether	in	environmental	policies	or	market	liberalisation.	Secondly,	the	
nature	of	the	regime	itself	has	never	been	a	single	unified	entity,	rather	a	geographically	
varied	and	loosely	coordinated	assemblage	held	together	by	a	mix	of	top-down	and	bottom-
up	processes.	Thirdly,	incumbent	energy	regimes	do	not	form	closed	systems,	but	are	the	
result	of	continuous	interactions	between	their	own	dynamics	and	seemingly	more	
exogenous	developments	in	society,	including	oil	crises,	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	or	financial	
crises,	as	well	as	radical	energy	innovations	emerging	from	niches.	
2.2 Grand	visions	and	pragmatic	integration	
In	this	paper	we	seek	to	extend	and	develop	Van	Der	Vleuten	and	Högselius’	work	on	
European	energy	regime	analysis.	Their	study	looked	across	the	European	electricity	and	gas	
sectors	and	provided	a	number	of	case	studies	–	environmental	policies,	security	of	supply	
concerns,	liberalisation	reforms	–	of	how	these	regimes	adapted	to	landscape	changes	and	
niche	innovations.	We	draw	on	their	material	and	approach,	but	focus	more	on	the	market	
aspects	of	electricity	integration	and	how,	today,	this	is	interacting	with	the	decarbonisation	
agenda.	We	also	further	the	conceptualisation	of	European	energy	regimes	by	moving	away	
from	the	rather	mechanistic	multi-level	perspective	on	regime	transition	(Williams	et	al.,	
2014).	We	propose	an	alternative	approach	which	examines	how	the	European	electricity	
regime	evolved	during	different	phases	through	efforts	to	pursue	transnational	grand	
visions	of	a	coherent,	seamless	and	integrated	European	system	through	largely	bottom-up	
processes	of	pragmatic	integration.	Grand	visions	and	pragmatic	integration	can	be	
summarised	as	follows:		
1. Grand	visions:	A	belief	that	integrating	systems	at	the	European	scale	provides	
efficiency	benefits	which	go	beyond	those	which	can	be	achieved	at	a	national	or	
sub-national	level.	This	belief	can	find	expression	in	ambitious	transnational	
infrastructure	schemes	and	network	blueprints,	and	politically	motivated	initiatives	
to	integrate	national	policies	and	strategies.	They	tend	to	embody	high	level	political	
ideals	and	economic	logics	and	imply	radical	change	if	implemented.		
2. Pragmatic	integration:	A	recognition	that	national	systems	have	become	strongly	
embedded	and	a	view	that	exchange	and	trading	between	systems	offers	a	means	of	
ensuring	their	stability	and	improving	efficiency	at	the	margin.	This	implies	
incremental	processes	of	integration	and	sees	a	European	market	is	an	addition	
rather	than	an	alternative	to	the	hegemony	of	national	systems.		
Grand	visions	and	pragmatic	integration	are	different	lenses	and	perspectives	on	electricity	
integration	which,	as	ideal	types,	have	radically	different	implications	in	terms	of	the	
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technical	and	institutional	organisation	of	the	electricity	system.	However,	as	we	outline	
below,	a	key	characteristic	of	European	electricity	integration	during	different	phases	has	
been	one	of	increasing	co-existence	and	interdependency	between	them.	The	analysis	of	
the	European	electricity	regime	through	this	lens	helps	to	explain	how	the	multi-level	
political	alignment	and	balance	of	power	and	influence	over	system	change	between	the	
national	and	the	European	levels	emerged.	This	has	become	a	key	continuity	and	is	shaping	
current	responses	to	the	low	carbon	transition.	
As	we	outline	in	detail	below,	regime	evolution	through	a	process	of	pursuing	grand	visions	
through	pragmatic	integration	processes	unfolded	gradually	during	the	course	of	the	20th	
century.	In	the	early	decades	of	electricity	integration	many	grand	visions	were	proposed	
but	in	the	post-war	era	pragmatic	integration	around	core	national	systems	was	established.	
Rather	than	the	creation	of	an	integrated	European	system,	this	period	saw	the	emergence	
of	an	embryonic	European	market	as	a	means	of	linking	national	systems.	We	outline	how	
the	European	market,	which	became	established	in	the	2000s,	has	been	based	on	a	new	
market-based	grand	vision,	the	design	of	which	incorporated	important	features	of	the	
earlier	pragmatic	integration	approach.	We	subsequently	discuss	how	today	we	are	seeing	a	
fracturing	of	this	regime	alignment.	
3 Historical	origins	of	a	European	electricity	regime	
3.1 An	era	of	grand	technological	visions	
Shortly	after	the	First	World	War,	during	a	period	of	combined	energy,	economic,	and	
political	crises,	electricity	gained	the	attention	of	policy-makers.	As	a	consequence,	the	first	
substantive	rules	and	regulations	governing	the	sector	were	developed	on	a	national	as	well	
as	an	international	scale.	Early	systems	for	industrial	demand	were	also	developed	close	to	
resource	bases	where	production	sites	in	emerging	industries	like	the	printing,	metallurgy,	
and	the	engineering	sector	were	supplied,	such	as	the	High	Rhine	bordering	Germany	and	
Switzerland	(Gugerli,	1994).	Enabled	by	innovations	in	high	voltage	transmission	technology,	
electricity	systems	became	less	reliant	on	local	generation	sources	to	meet	demand	and	
hence	they	could	be	expanded	to	link	and	incorporate	a	wider	range	of	geographically	
dispersed	resources.	A	new	engineering-logic	emerged,	with	the	question	of	how	to	achieve	
an	“economic	mix”	(Hughes,	1983)	of	different	generating	sources	becoming	central.	In	key	
regions	such	as	the	German-Swiss	border	engineers	were	concerned	with	how	to	
incorporate	into	one	system	hydropower	resources,	which	was	high	capital	costs	and	low	
running	costs	but	with	seasonally	varying	peak	production,	with	thermal	power	stations,	
which	provided	a	steady	base-load	at	relatively	high	running	costs.	
Within	nation-states	the	1910s	and	‘20s	saw	an	increasing	politicisation	of	electricity	
systems	and	their	evolution,	resulting	in	a	change	from	the	dominant	role	of	private	
companies	(often	alliances	between	manufacturers	of	electrical	equipment	and	financial	
institutions),	to	a	larger	role	for	public	authorities	(Hausman	et	al.,	2008).	Both	national	and	
regional	authorities	(e.g.	on	the	level	of	provinces	or	Bundesländer)	started	to	legislate	and	
regulate,	and	also	took	on	a	more	active	in	building	networks.	Crucially,	national	and	
regional	authorities	did	not	see	electricity	as	a	market	system,	but	rather	as	a	public	utility	
(Bouneau	et	al,	2007,	p.35).	Whereas	companies	operated	on	an	international	level,	and	
thus	also	transmitted	electricity	across	borders	from	the	dawn	of	the	20th	century,	the	
nationalist	tendencies	of	the	interwar	years	prioritised	national	utilisation	of	resources,	later	
dubbed	“the	nationalisation	of	nature”	(White,	1999).	For	electricity	companies	who	
	 8	
typically	operated	across	borders,	this	meant	restricting	their	business	opportunities	and	
limiting	their	rationalisation	efforts	to	within	national	borders.	At	various	international	
conferences,	engineers	argued	that	the	pursuit	of	an	economic	mix	should	supercede	
territorial	borders	and	any	political	considerations;	a	logic	which	is	summarised	in	the	
following	quote	from	a	prominent	engineer	of	the	time:	“[international	connections]	can	
never	have	any	but	a	useful	and	beneficial	effect	from	all	points	of	view”	(Landry,	1926:	p.	
1117).	
As	technology	and	power	systems	engineering	knowledge	advanced,	the	idea	of	placing	
control	over	the	system	into	the	hands	of	a	single	national	or	regional	operator	gained	
prominence.	The	growing	importance	of	electricity	for	industry	and	society	made	authorities	
more	aware	of	security	of	supply	issues	and	the	idea	of	electricity	as	a	key	strategic	good	for	
society	gained	political	traction.	In	response,	several	countries	installed	so-called	load	
dispatchers;	a	centralised	office	in	charge	of	managing	regional	grids	and	ensuring	an	
economic	mix	between	various	types	of	generation	sources	(Bouneau,	1994,	Stier,	2006,	
Verbong	et	al.,	1998).	This	added	a	strong	regulating	governance	layer	to	what	had	been	up	
until	then	a	largely	private	industry,	and	it	facilitated	the	growth	of	networks	and	a	more	
optimal	use	of	resources.		
The	question	of	what	remit	these	load	dispatchers	should	have	and	the	geographical	scope	
of	their	operations	became	a	key	point	of	discussion	and	debate.	One	option	concerned	the	
construction	of	national	grids,	essentially	interconnecting	the	existing	local	and	increasingly	
regional	networks.	One	of	the	first	explicit	visions	of	this	kind	came	from	Munich	engineer	
Oskar	von	Miller	who	proposed	the	creation	of	a	German	national	system	with	the	grid	of	
the	Rheinisch-Westfälisch	Elektrizitätswerk	(RWE)	as	its	backbone,	shown	in	figure	2	below	
(Füssl,	2005).	Although	a	private	cooperation,	the	Essen-based	RWE	had	municipalities	who	
operated	their	local	systems	as	public	utilities	as	majority	stock	owners.	Visions	of	a	
European	system	sought	to	do	virtually	the	same	in	terms	of	achieving	efficiencies	from	
aggregating	smaller	systems,	but	on	a	much	grander	scale.	For	example,	electrical	engineer	
and	entrepreneur	Oskar	Oliven,	a	director	of	an	international	company	building	and	running	
electrical	facilities,	envisioned	the	RWE	regional	system	as	part	of	a	European-wide	grid	
(Oliven,	1930).	The	scheme,	shown	in	figure	3	(Génissieu,	1926),	envisioned	arteries	of	
transmission	lines	spanning	the	European	continent,	connecting	large	thermal	generators	
and	hydro	plants	with	major	sites	of	consumption.		
While	the	geographic	composition	of	these	European	systems	differed,	the	basic	
engineering-logics	of	both	visions	were	quite	similar;	i.e.,	electricity	generation,	often	
distant	from	sites	of	consumption,	combined	with	large-scale	synchronised	transmission	
lines	based	on	the	use	of	novel	high	voltage	technologies	which	had	not	yet	been	put	into	
practice.	In	both	instances	the	proponents	of	these	grand	visions	they	saw	themselves	as	
technicians	improving	societies,	pursuing	an	alternative	and	non-political	pathway	
(Lagendijk,	2012).	A	key	difference	was	that	they	sought	to	appeal	to	different	political	
constituencies	and	they	had	an	associated	difference	in	what	might	be	termed	an	
ideological	mix.		
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Figure	2:	Rheinisch-Westfälisch	Elektrizitätswerk	(RWE)	system	(Génissieu,	1926)	
	
Figure	3:	Oliven’s	vision	(Oliven,	1930)	
Many	of	the	early	visions	proposed	by	individual	engineers	and	companies	had	an	
instrumental	purpose,	to	position	politics	in	a	way	which	enabled	a	particular	technical	logic	
to	be	inscribed	into	the	design	and	configuration	of	the	electricity	system.	This	led	to	
specific	geographies	of	a	European	system	being	proposed	which,	for	example,	included	or	
excluded	the	Soviet	Union	or	Great	Britain,	depending	on	the	priorities	and	interests	of	the	
particular	proponent.	However,	while	engineers	at	least	rhetorically	tried	to	refrain	from	
engaging	in	politics,	energy	and	electricity	systems	increasingly	become	an	issue	in	
intergovernmental	policy-making.	This	“technocratic	internationalist”	engineering	agenda,	
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which	was	strongly	influenced	by	the	rise	of	the	European	movement	(Schot	and	Lagendijk,	
2008),	evolved	into	a	more	heterogeneous	ensemble	of	politicians,	nobility,	intellectuals,	
entrepreneurs,	and	engineers.	The	connection	to	a	European	movement	and	international	
politics	helped	engineers	to	conceive	of	a	European	system	as	it	gave	them	political	
legitimacy,	but	it	also	brought	with	it	resources	to	develop	the	knowledge	base	and	explore	
the	technical	and	economic	feasibility	of	various	system	configurations.	Rather	than	the	
more	pragmatic	actions	on	the	national	level,	these	proposals	should	be	seen	as	European	
grand	visions.	
In	practice,	however,	the	inter-war	period	firmly	established	nationally-based	electricity	
regimes,	but	with	a	gradual	steps	towards	fulfilling	versions	of	the	European	grand	vision.	A	
key	development	was	the	League	of	Nations	deciding	to	take	the	notion	of	transnational	
electricity	systems	up	for	further	study.	The	attention	and	resources	that	the	Geneva	
institution	devoted	to	electricity	interconnection	was	a	turning	point	in	the	development	of	
the	engineering	grand	vision	from	the	early	1930s.	Prior	to	this	the	League	had	tried	to	get	
countries	to	agree	to	ambitious	legislation	on	the	exploitation	of	international	watercourses	
and	the	international	transmission	of	electricity.	This	led	to	little	ratification	however,	and	
from	the	early	1930s	an	approach	which	tried	to	merge	the	national	and	European	treads	in	
resource	governance	and	design	of	large	technical	systems	was	pursued.	At	the	same	time,	
engineers	and	representatives	of	private	utilities	argued	to	keep	borders	open,	but	instead	
of	advocating	for	the	construction	of	a	European	grid	with	one	load	dispatch	centre,	an	
ambitious	approach	which	seemed	out	of	sync	with	political	and	economic	circumstances	at	
the	time,	these	actors	opted	instead	for	a	gradual	extension	of	regional	and	national	
networks,	which	they	felt	was	the	most	feasible	route	to	eventually	achieving	a	European	
system.	Thus,	the	grand	vision	of	a	newly-built	European	network	seemed	to	be	giving	way	
to	the	pragmatic	approach	with	network-integration	first	pursued	at	the	nation-state	level,	
similar	to	Von	Miller’s	plan	in	Germany,	and	a	possible	European	grid	emerging	out	of	the	
interconnection	of	these	grids.	While	these	official	plans	were	put	on	hold	during	the	next	
war,	a	European	agenda	had	been	set	for	engineers	and	policy-makers	alike	for	further	
rationalising	electricity	supply	across	national	borders.	However,	at	the	European	level	no	
genuine	and	robust	governance	structure	was	put	in	place	as	international	economic	and	
political	tensions	stifled	the	League’s	work.	
3.2 Hidden	integration	after	World	War	Two		
The	inter-war	period	saw	the	emergence	of	a	pragmatic	national	approach	to	integration	
which	was	shaped	by	an	alignment	of	engineering	logics	and	political	processes.	This	shaped	
the	expectations	of	engineers	and	planners	which	became	largely	focused	on	ways	of	
making	the	existing	systems	more	robust,	secure,	and	efficient	(Lagendijk,	2013).	Efforts	
were	made	by	these	actors	to	ensure	that	national	system	development	was	done	in	a	way	
which	did	not	close	off	the	idea	of	a	European	system,	particularly	in	continental	western	
Europe.	In	practice,	thus,	the	European	vision	needed	to	be	synchronised	(quite	literally)	
with	these	national	developments.	Also,	further	complicating	the	international	picture	were	
Cold	War	tensions	which	created	significant	political	impediments	to	European	grand	visions	
and	lead	to	a	virtual	separation	between	Western,	and	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.	
In	many	ways	there	was	a	significant	level	of	continuity	between	the	interwar	and	wartime	
periods.	National	public	authorities	continued	to	extend	their	influence	and	remit	over	
system	design	and	coordination	decisions,	resulting	in	a	minimal	level	of	foreign	
interference.	In	some	countries,	such	as	France	and	the	UK,	this	led	to	full-blown	
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nationalisation	of	the	energy	sectors,	whereas	in	others	alliances	of	regional	governments	
and	private	utilities	remained	in	control	(e.g.	Germany)	(Gilbert	et	al.,	1996:	p.5).	Largely	
autonomous	private	companies,	who	were	instrumental	and	powerful	since	the	dawn	of	the	
20th	century,	lost	ground	(Hausman	et	al.,	2008,	p.	223	&	234-238).	Dubbed	a	process	of	
“domestication”	by	Hausman	et	al.,	this	gave	rise	to	vertically	integrated	public/semi-public	
electricity	companies.		
Alongside	this	domestic	governance	layer,	new	international	governance	practices	became	
increasingly	institutionalised	through	a	process	of	“hidden	integration”	led	by	industrialists	
and	technical	experts,	somewhat	removed	from	high	politics	(Misa	and	Schot,	2005).	The	
Organisation	for	Economic	European	Cooperation	(OEEC,	founded	in	1948)	which	was	
established	to	distribute	the	Marshall	Plan	funds	emerged	as	a	key	actor	in	this	context.	In	
its	1950	report	“Interconnected	Power	Systems	in	the	USA	and	Western	Europe”	(OEEC,	
1950)	it	discussed	several	options	for	electricity	cooperation	and	interconnection.	Although	
plans	for	supranational	ownership	of	power	plants	and	transmission	lines	were	put	forward,	
for	political	reasons	and	because	of	the	increasingly	national	orientation	of	large	energy	
corporations,	these	were	consistently	voted	down	by	energy	representatives	of	Western	
European	countries	for	being	incompatible	with	the	pragmatic	and	national	vision	
(Lagendijk,	2008,	pp.	124–131).	Voluntary	pooling	of	power	was	identified	as	being	more	
feasible	as	it	provided	national	systems	with	the	option	of	reaping	the	benefits	of	an	
economic	mix	at	a	transnational	scale	and	mutual	assistance	in	case	of	emergencies,	whilst	
keeping	the	smaller	national	and	sub-national	units	firmly	under	national	control.		
Such	pooling	arrangements	would	however	required	stronger	technical	and	institutional	
integration,	and	in	1951	eight	countries	founded	the	Union	for	the	Coordination	of	
Production	and	Transmission	of	Electricity5	(UCPTE).	This	was	initially	an	informal	union	and	
composed	of	individual	representatives	from	the	national	network	operators	(see	figure	4	
for	an	overview	of	the	evolution	of	UCPTE	membership).	The	UCPTE	began	its	work	by	
establishing	a	set	of	operational	rules	to	improve	efficiencies	from	surplus	hydro	power	and	
by	pooling	reserve	capacity	among	the	participating	networks.	In	contrast	to	today’s	power	
pools,	these	were	non-monetary	forms	of	cooperation	and	did	not	involve	sophisticated	
market	rules,	but	the	approach	can	be	seen	as	an	embryo	of	today’s	market-based	regime.	
The	UCPTE	system	aimed	to	make	more	efficient	use	of	resources	whilst	retaining	a	
significant	level	of	national	sovereignty	and	autonomy.	Therefore,	the	use	of	international	
connections	was	modest	at	best;	international	energy	flows	were	important	from	a	
qualitative	point	of	view	–	solving	temporary	shortages	and	exchanging	surplus	
hydroelectricity	–	but	quantitatively	rather	limited	and	variable	(Verbong,	2006).	
																																																						
5	Initially	composed	of	the	integrated	energy	companies	in	Belgium,	Germany,	France,	Italy,	Luxembourg,	the	
Netherlands,	Austria	and	Switzerland.	
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Figure	4:	UCPTE	membership	1951-1996.	Compiled	by	the	authors.	
By	the	end	of	the	1950s,	the	systems	of	UCPTE	members	operated	under	common	technical	
conditions,	at	the	single	frequency	of	50Hz.	The	technological	system	tightly	coupled	the	
national	systems	with	a	European	logic	of	rationality	and	efficiency.	The	result	was	a	high	
degree	of	interdependence	between	national	systems,	where	temporary	shortages	or	
surpluses	in	one	country	triggered	an	automatic	response	in	adjacent	countries,	resulting	in	
a	very	reliable	electricity	supply	system,	with	no	large	cross-border	disturbances	until	2003	
(Lagendijk	and	Van	der	Vleuten,	2013).	By	the	end	of	the	20th	century	the	technical	
interconnection	between	transmission	system	operators	(TSOs)	within	Europe	was	even	
tighter,	but	also	geographically	larger	as	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	joined	in	
the	1990s.	Until	then,	the	UCPTE	system	consisted	of	shared	technical	standards	and	
organisational	structures,	while,	to	use	Summerton’s	words,	“still	retaining	the	essential	
identity	and	autonomy	of	the	individual	systems”	(Summerton,	1999:	p.	93).	Francis	
McGowan	called	this	the	“paradox	of	sovereignty”,	arguing	that	while	national	governments	
were	trying	to	remain	in	control,	regulatory	responsibilities	moved	more	towards	the	
international	level	(McGowan,	1999:	p.	137).	In	many	ways,	this	system	came	about	through	
the	pragmatic	extension	of	national	systems	with	transnational	flows	as	an	additional	
European	layer	of	efficiency	and	security,	rather	than	the	transformative	and	grand	
European	vision.	However,	during	this	period	we	can	see	how	it	was	not	a	matter	of	one	
replacing	the	other,	they	became	interdependent.		
4 Building	the	market	regime	
The	European	system	which	evolved	over	the	20th	century	was	tightly-coupled,	hierarchical,	
and	dominated	by	monopolists.	While	European	in	character,	it	was	primarily	based	on	
bilateral	electricity	exchange,	and	not	multilateral	trade.	Yet,	around	the	turn	of	the	century	
a	new	grand	vision	was	emerging,	one	of	a	European	market.	As	part	of	the	negotiations	
leading	up	to	the	Treaty	of	Rome	(1957),	cumulating	in	a	European	Economic	Community,	
electricity	and	gas	were	discussed	within	the	framework	of	a	common	market.	However,	it	
was	argued	at	the	time	that	the	network-bound	nature	of	energy	rendered	the	introduction	
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of	market	principles	impossible	(Lagendijk,	2011).	Although	energy	(and	thus	electricity)	
remained	on	the	agenda	of	the	European	Commission,	the	UCPTE	tried	to	keep	this	at	arm’s	
length;	it	felt	it	already	took	part	in	European	integration	and	spoke	out	against	
supranationalism.	However,	the	pressure	became	too	much	as	the	Commission	and	key	
countries	came	to	support	European	level	electricity	market	liberalisation	and	the	UPCTE	
became	the	subject	of	reform	(Lagendijk,	2011).	The	vision	of	a	European	system	thus	
became	a	vision	of	a	market,	whereby	cross-border	exchanges	came	to	be	commercial	
transactions	and	electricity	would	flow	to	where	it	is	cheapest,	regardless	of	national	
borders.	This	became	the	high	level	goal	around	which	different	types	of	political,	industrial	
and	technocratic	actors	cohered,	particularly	economic	regulators,	the	Commission,	and	
some	national	governments.	
4.1 Background	to	electricity	market	liberalisation	
The	re-launch	of	European	cooperation	in	the	1980s	came	with	a	renewed	grand	vision,	one	
which	included	ambitious	rhetoric	on	further	completion	of	an	internal	market,	including	
the	postal,	communications,	and	energy	sectors,	in	order	not	to	“drop	back	into	mediocrity”	
(European	Commission,	1985:	p.57).	Although	the	initial	1985	White	Paper	on	the	Single	
Market	contained	some	proposals	on	energy,	technical	and	political	barriers	were	perceived	
to	impose	barriers	on	market	functioning	in	monopoly	sectors	such	as	energy,	
telecommunications	and	water.	This	argument	was	spearheaded	by	Lord	Cockfield,	the	vice-
president	of	the	Commission	at	the	time	(Buchan	and	Keay,	2016b).	As	a	result,	the	
liberalisation	programme	for	electricity	was	side-lined	in	these	early	discussions	about	the	
internal	market.	However,	in	the	years	following	the	agreement	of	the	Single	European	Act	
in	1986	energy	liberalisation	became	more	of	a	focus.	The	European	Commission	took	up	its	
role	as	the	key	driver	of	market-led	integration,	focusing	on	the	application	of	treaty	rules	
and	the	use	of	competition	policy	to	open	up	cross	border	trade,	public	procurement	of	
energy	and	the	introduction	of	competition	in	monopoly	sectors	(European	Commission	
1988).	The	successful	implementation	of	competitive	electricity	markets	in	Britain	(England	
&	Wales)	and	Norway	in	the	early	1990s	were	significant	in	that	they	set	a	precedent	and	
diminished	the	argument	against	liberalisation.		
Although	the	initial	target	for	implementation	of	a	single	market	for	electricity	was	1992,	it	
was	not	until	1996	with	the	First	Energy	Package6	when	substantial	reforms	began	to	be	
implemented.	This	was	later	followed	by	a	more	substantial	Second	Package	in	20037,	which	
began	to	restrict	the	discretion	of	member	states	by	imposing	the	unbundling	of	generators	
and	transmission	networks	and	introducing	regulatory	regimes	for	third-party	grid	access.	
The	key	difference	between	the	first	and	second	packages	was	that	unbundling	and	the	
regulation	of	third	party	access	to	the	natural	monopoly	networks	became	mandatory	and	
strict	legal	requirements	were	imposed	upon	member	states	(Squicciarini	et	al.,	2010).		
This	period	of	change	led	to	the	creation	of	a	number	of	new	industry	organisations	and	
bodies	which	took	the	place	of	the	previously	dominant	UCPTE.	UCPTE	became	UCTE	in	
1999,	indicating	the	separation	of	production	and	transmission,	and	a	broader	coordination	
body,	European	Transmission	System	Operators	(ETSO),	was	formed	with	the	aim	of	linking	
																																																						
6	Directive	96/92EC	concerning	common	rules	for	the	internal	market	of	electricity	
7	Directive	2003/54EC	concerning	common	rules	for	the	internal	market	of	electricity.	Regulation	(EC)	
1228/2003	on	conditions	for	access	to	the	network	for	cross-border	exchanges	of	electricity.		
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a	number	of	cross-border	transmission	bodies.8	This	period	following	the	Second	Package	
also	saw	the	rise	in	prominence	of	a	group	who	have	since	become	increasingly	influential	in	
the	integration	process;	energy	regulators.	The	European	Regulators	Group	for	Electricity	
and	Gas	(ERGEG)	was	formed	in	2003	(to	be	replaced	by	ACER	in	2011)	and	its	role	was	“to	
advise	the	Commission	particularly	in	matters	of	implementation	of	energy	market	
legislation,	and	to	ease	co-ordination	among	national	energy	regulators”	(Jevnaker,	2015).	
However,	throughout	this	period	the	reach	of	the	Commission	was	limited.	It	was	not	until	
the	Lisbon	Treaty,	signed	in	2007,	that	the	EU	gained	a	significant	energy	policy	remit	in	the	
areas	of	energy	market	functioning,	security	of	supply,	interconnection	and	energy	
efficiency	&	renewables.	However,	reflecting	the	historically	embedded	balance	of	power	
and	alignment	of	the	national	and	European	levels,	it	is	made	clear	in	the	Treaty	that	this	
“shall	not	affect	a	Member	State’s	right	to	determine	the	conditions	for	exploiting	its	energy	
resources,	its	choice	between	different	energy	sources	and	the	general	structure	of	its	
energy	supply”	(quote	from	Article	194	of	Lisbon	Treaty)9.	This	reflected	the	historically	
embedded	balance	of	power	and	alignment	of	the	national	and	European	levels.	
Much	has	been	written	about	the	overtly	political	aspects	of	implementing	the	IEM,	
focusing	in	particular	on	the	contested	liberalisation	and	unbundling	process	which	was	
opposed	by	many	Member	States	(Padgett,	1992:	p.	54).	This	represented	an	important	
discontinuity	which	threatened	to	dismantle	the	established	regime	of	national	systems	
with	limited	cross-border	exchange.	However,	this	did	not	turn	out	to	be	case.	During	the	
2000s	the	regime	reconfigured	itself	and	a	new	set	of	pan-European	organisations	and	
alliances	emerged	which	became	increasingly	influential	in	developing	the	detailed	rules,	
codes	and	frameworks	for	the	IEM.	A	key	development	was	the	formulation	of	a	“Target	
Model”;	a	high-level	template	for	the	European	market.	
4.2 Creating	and	implementing	the	Target	Model	vision	
As	has	been	outlined	above,	integration	was	initially	on	the	basis	of	bilateral	electricity	
exchange	rather	than	a	system	of	multilateral	and	coordinated	trading	with	fluctuating	
prices	determining	power	flows	across	borders.	Since	the	2000s	however	a	process	for	
developing	and	agreeing	rules	for	cross-border	trade	was	setup	and	at	its	centre	was	a	new	
body;	the	Florence	Forum	of	energy	regulators.	In	the	late	1990s	the	Commission	
established	two	such	fora,	Florence	for	the	electricity	sector	and	Madrid	for	gas,	which	meet	
bi-annually	in	order	to	“bring	together	national	regulators	and	ministries	with	important	
market	actors	and	stakeholders,	in	particular	network	operators	as	well	as	industry	
consumers	and	traders”	(Eberlein,	2008:	p.	78).		
A	key	task	for	the	Florence	Forum	was	to	advise	the	Commission	on	capacity	allocation	and	
congestion	management	(CACM)	on	cross-border	interconnectors.	The	Electricity	Cross-
Border	Regulation10	which	accompanied	the	Electricity	Directive	in	the	Second	Package	
contained	guidelines	for	managing	CACM	which	were	largely	based	on	the	traditional	model	
																																																						
8	ATSOI	(Island	of	Ireland);	BALTSO	(Estonia,	Latvia	and	Lithuania);	NORDEL	(Denmark,	Finland,	Iceland,	Sweden	
and	Norway);	UKTSOA	(United	Kingdom).	For	a	short	history	see:	https://www.entsoe.eu/news-events/former-
associations/etso/Pages/default.aspx	(Accessed	28.7.17)	
9	http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-and-
comments/part-3-union-policies-and-internal-actions/title-xxi-energy/485-article-194.html		
10	Regulation	1228/2003	
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of	bilateral	exchange	and	“explicit	auctioning”	–	interconnector	capacity	is	calculated	and	
auctioned	by	TSOs	based	on	“net	transfer	capacities”	well	in	advance	and	largely	separate	
from	transactions	in	the	wholesale	electricity	market.	As	a	result,	there	was	significant	
underutilisation	of	interconnector	capacity	across	Europe,	running	counter	to	the	new	
market	paradigm.	In	order	to	enable	a	market	where	frictionless	trade	across	borders	was	
possible	a	more	sophisticated	method	based	on	“implicit	auctioning”	–	aligning	the	
calculation	and	allocation	of	interconnector	capacity	with	price	signals	in	the	wholesale	
market	–	was	needed.	Doing	so	was	a	significant	technical	challenge11	and	the	design	and	
implementation	of	such	a	method	could	not	have	been	achieved	without	the	technical	
expertise	and	cooperation	of	the	TSOs.		
The	initial	strategy	for	developing	the	rules	for	cross-border	trade	was	a	process	of	regional	
level	experimentation	and	learning,	the	Florence	Forum	would	act	as	an	aggregator	of	these	
lessons	and	filter	and	communicate	key	findings	to	the	Commission.	The	Commission	
amended	guidelines	to	legally	underpin	the	regional	approach	(Squicciarini	et	al.,	2010)	and	
in	2006	countries	were	grouped	into	seven	Regional	Energy	Initiatives	(REIs)12,	each	with	a	
regulatory	coordination	committee	composed	primarily	of	industry	actors	and	a	stakeholder	
group,	an	approach	that	Trinh	and	Meeus	(2009)	term	the	“Florence	process”.	The	key	
incentives	for	taking	this	regional	and	networked	governance	approach	was	to	build	
collaborations	and	consensus	behind	the	liberalisation	agenda.	This	was,	firstly,	because	of	
the	Commission’s	“lack	of	supranational	governmental	powers”	(Eberlein,	2008,	p.	77),	and	
secondly,	to	draw	on	distributed	expertise.	As	illustrated	in	the	following	quote	from	
Eberlein’s	analysis	of	the	Florence	Forum,	there	was	strong	resonances	with	the	previous	
tradition	of	hidden	integration:	“These	transnational	coalitions	are	designed	to	further	
domestic	reforms	without	having	to	resort	to	the	level	of	political	decision	making	by	
governments	and	legislators”	(ibid,	p.	77.	Emphasis	in	orignial).	
However,	despite	a	recognition	of	the	benefits	of	regional	collaboration	as	a	pragmatic	
means	of	achieving	integration,	it	was	only	ever	seen	by	the	Commission	as	an	interim	
phase	(Squicciarini	et	al.,	2010).	During	the	2000s	the	Commission	became	concerned	that	a	
regional	approach	could	result	in	new	lock-ins	where	incompatible	systems	developed	in	a	
fragmented	manner.	Around	this	time,	they	stated	that	“Market	parties	shall	not	be	
confronted	with	incompatible	regional	systems”	(Commission,	quoted	in	Squicciarini	et	al.,	
2010).	The	Florence	Forum	was	mobilised	in	order	to	respond	to	and	address	this	concern.	
In	2007	a	temporary	working	group	was	setup	called	the	Project	Coordination	Group	(PCG)	
which	comprised	selected	Commission,	regulatory	and	industry	personnel	in	order	to	
																																																						
11	The	problem	is	one	of	accounting	for	physical	flows	on	an	electricity	network	and	aligning	physical	and	
commercial	flows.	In	essence	electricity	in	a	network	flows	according	to	the	laws	of	physics	(‘Kirchoff’s	laws’)	
rather	than	those	of	economics,	as	explained	by	Van	den	Bergh	et	al.:	"electricity	does	not	flow	directly	from	
generator	to	consumer,	but	spreads	out	over	all	parallel	paths	in	the	network,	according	to	Kirchhoff’s	laws.	
There	is	hence	a	fundamental	difference	between	commercial	flows	(i.e.,	the	shortest	path	in	the	network	
between	generator	and	consumer)	and	physical	flows	through	the	grid”	(Van	den	Bergh	et	al.,	2016).	Electricity	
flows	may	not	therefore	follow	expected	routes	if	one	was	basing	expectations	on	market	signals,	allocating	
transmission	capacity	to	cover	future	demand	in	an	efficient	way	is	therefore	technically	challenging.	The	issue	
is	most	acute	in	highly	integrated	meshed	networks,	such	as	in	Central	and	Western	Europe,	as	oppose	to	
simpler	radial	ones.		
12	“Baltic,	Central-East,	Central-West,	Central-South,	Northern,	South-West	and	France-UK-Ireland”	(Trinh	and	
Meeus,	2009).	 
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develop	a	higher	level	“Target	Model”	(TM)	for	system	integration13.	The	PCG	deliberated	
for	a	number	of	months	and	presented	its	views	at	the	subsequent	Forum	meeting	in	2008.	
They	recommended	a	shift	in	emphasis	away	from	the	regional	“two-layer	approach”	based	
around	REIs,	towards	“a	top-down	approach”	(Squicciarini	et	al.,	2010).	The	Forum	also	
requested	that	ETSO	and	Europex,	the	association	of	European	power	exchanges,	jointly	
develop	a	proposal	for	market-based	capacity	allocation	on	interconnectors	which	would	
subsequently	be	trialled	and	rolled	out	across	the	IEM	by	2015.	Following	a	consultation	
process	and	a	report	(ETSO	and	EUROPEX,	2009)	the	TM	vision	which	emerged	from	this	
process	had	as	its	key	components	price	formation	through	day-ahead	market	trading	and	
the	management	of	interconnector	flows	using	a	market	coupling	methodology	called	
“flow-based	market	coupling”	(FBMC)	which	links	rather	than	dissolves	the	existing	national	
markets14.		
The	subsequent	3rd	Energy	Package	saw	a	formalisation	of	this	regime	with	the	creation	of	
the	Agency	for	the	Cooperation	of	Energy	Regulators	(ACER)	and	the	European	Network	for	
Transmission	Systems	Operators	(ENTSO-E).	ENTSO-E,	along	with	being	an	industry	
coordinating	body,	was	given	a	statutory	role	to	co-develop,	along	with	ACER,	the	rules	for	
the	IEM	in	the	form	of	network	codes.	The	new	regulation	on	conditions	for	access	to	the	
network	for	cross-border	exchanges	in	electricity15	set	out	the	creation	of	detailed	code	for	
CACM	based	on	the	FBMC	methodology.	CACM	is	just	one	of	a	number	of	codes	relating	to	
the	formalisation	of	the	IEM	and	the	process	for	agreeing	and	implementing	the	various	
codes	is	itself	a	highly	complex	one.	
5 Low	carbon	transition	–	can	the	market	regime	adapt?	
Through	the	analysis	above	we	have	seen	how	the	European	electricity	regime	developed	
and	was	shaped	by	efforts	to	create	a	synergistic	relationship	between	a	high-level	grand	
vision	of	a	fully	integrated	system	and	the	practical	operation	of	systems,	largely	at	the	
national	level.	A	key	source	of	coherence	and	strength	in	the	European	electricity	regime	
has	been	an	arrangement	where	complex	scale	alignments	between	regions,	nations	and	
the	transnational	level	were	possible.	We	have	shown	how	this	came	about	in	the	20th	
century	as	consensus	was	built	amongst	powerful	system	actors	that	transnational	
																																																						
13		The	work	of	the	project	coordination	group	is	detailed	here:	
https://www.ceer.eu/eer_workshop/stakeholder_fora/florence_fora/pcg	(Accessed	28.7.17)	
14	FBMC	simplifies	the	system	as	each	price	zone,	typically	(though	not	necessarily)	a	national	system,	is	seen	
as	a	single	node.	At	the	outset	the	FBMC	methodology	doesn’t	interfere	with	or	take	into	account	flows	within	
national	markets.	It	takes	as	its	starting	point	the	existing	structures	of	national	markets	and	power	exchanges	
which	have	developed	at	the	various	borders	and	uses	a	common	algorithm	used	by	TSOs	and	power	
exchanges	to	optimise	interconnector	capacity.	Changes	to	the	structure	of	price	zones	can	be	imposed	
however,	if	it	is	determined	that	transmission	constraints	in	a	particular	part	of	the	system	are	interfering	with	
the	operation	of	the	market.	FBMC	is	different	from	the	approach	which	has	been	in	use	in	the	Nordic	
countries	since	the	late	1990s.	Here,	rather	than	a	number	of	power	exchanges	calculating	interconnector	
capacity	simultaneously	using	a	shared	algorithm,	a	single	power	exchange,	the	Norpool	Spot,	allocates	
interconnector	capacity	based	on	market	signals	and	takes	into	account	the	entire	system	rather	than	
individual	interconnectors.	This	approach	is	referred	to	a	market	splitting	because	the	system	is	divided	into	a	
number	of	price	zones	defined	around	constraints	on	the	transmission	grid.	This	is	similar	in	ways	to	locational	
marginal	pricing,	a	method	in	operation	in	the	US	which	is	generally	favoured	by	economists	because	
transmission	constraints	are	calculated	in	real	time	at	each	node	of	the	network	rather	than	aggregated	over	
larger	price	zones.	
15	Regulation	(EC)	No	714/2009	
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interconnection	offers	technical	and	economic	efficiencies,	and	was	later	formalised	in	
detailed	regimes	rules,	methods,	codes	and	governance	structures	for	the	IEM.	As	we	
outline	below,	a	concern	for	proponents	of	the	IEM	is	that	the	rapid	deployment	of	
renewable	generation	in	some	countries	is	undermining	some	of	the	basic	principles	and	
presumptions	of	the	TM.	A	particular	source	of	frustration	for	European	market	advocates	
has	been	the	introduction	of	capacity	mechanisms16	in	many	countries	in	order	to	integrate	
renewables	without	compromising	system	reliability	and	capacity	adequacy	(European	
Commission,	2016).	A	fundamental	principle	of	the	TM	is	an	“energy-only”	market	(EOM)	
where	operational	and	investment	decisions	are	made	solely	on	the	basis	of	price	signals	
from	the	wholesale	market.	Providing	revenue	streams	outside	of	the	EOM	to	generators	in	
the	form	of	capacity	payments	is	seen	to	interfere	with	this	as	the	decision	to	invest	in	or	
shut	down	a	power	plant	is	to	some	extent	de-coupled	from	the	market	(Bolton	et	al.,	
2016).	To	date	the	main	response	has	been	one	of	regime	adaptation	based	on	an	ambition	
of	maintaining	continuity	within	the	regime,	with	the	high	level	goal	of	market-based	
integration	remaining	largely	intact.	
5.1 Resolving	tensions	in	the	market	regime		
The	EU’s	recent	Winter	Package	titled	'Clean	Energy	for	All	Europeans'17	published	in	late	
2016	sets	out	initial	proposals	to	reform	various	aspects	of	the	market	in	an	effort	to	align	
national	developments	with	the	IEM,	in	particular	the	introduction	of	capacity	mechanisms	
and	renewable	support	mechanisms,	which	have	to	date	been	primarily	orientated	towards	
addressing	national	energy	security	and	decarbonisation	objectives.	The	Package	contains	
proposals	to	link	renewables	support	mechanisms	to	wholesale	markets,	to	open	up	
capacity	markets	to	non-domestic	providers,	to	introduce	a	common	methodology	for	
calculating	capacity	adequacy	and	to	require	nation-states	to	have	a	reliability	standard	in	
place	which	is	then	used	as	a	basis	to	justify	the	introduction	of	any	additional	payments	for	
capacity.	Whether	this	rear-guard	action	against	the	potential	renationalisation	of	energy	
policy	and	the	effort	to	reposition	the	European	market	at	the	centre	of	the	low	carbon	
transition	will	succeed	is	uncertain.		
Another	unresolved	issue	which	the	market	reforms	will	need	to	address	is	the	changing	
spatial	scale	of	energy	system	integration.	Given	that	renewables	and	other	low	carbon	
technologies	are	increasingly	being	integrated	at	the	distribution	system	operator	(DSO)	
level,	the	Winter	Package	sets	out	to	provide	clarity	on	how	future	TSO-DSO	interactions	
might	be	formalised.	Historically	TSOs	have	been	the	key	system	integrators	and	their	
central	role	in	shaping	the	European	system	has	been	a	strong	continuity,	essentially	based	
on	the	idea	of	economies	of	scale	in	the	generation	and	bulk	transmission	of	electricity,	and	
that	the	economic	mix	of	generators	is	best	achieved	by	sharing	different	types	of	
geographically	dispersed	resources.	However,	a	shift	towards	decentralised	technologies	
and	a	more	customer-centric,	services	based,	energy	system	may	challenge	this	economic	
logic	and	see	the	emergence	of	new	system	integrators	(Bolton	and	Foxon,	2013).	For	
example,	DSOs	may	form	new	alliances	with	service	providers	and	other	actors	who	have	
																																																						
16	Various	ways	of	providing	revenue	streams	to	providers	of	capacity,	most	commonly	as	strategic	reserves	or	
through	a	capacity	market.	
17	Proposals	are	outlined	in	a	number	of	documents.	Available	here:	
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/commission-proposes-new-rules-consumer-centred-clean-energy-
transition.	For	a	useful	summary	see	(Hancher	and	Winters,	2017)			
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less	of	a	strategic	interest	in	increasing	transnational	flows.	In	this	scenario,	where	most	of	
the	system	change	happens	at	the	sub-national	level,	the	high	voltage	transmission	grids	
may	become	less	central	and	evolve	into	systems	for	balancing	and	handling	residual	flows,	
as	oppose	to	being	conduits	for	bulk	flows	of	power	between	sites	of	generation	and	
consumption.	Given	the	political	power	and	influence	of	TSOs	and	the	important	role	that	
DSOs	are	likely	to	play	in	the	future,	it	seems	unlikely	that	such	structural	issues	will	be	
addressed	solely	through	regime	adaptations.	
5.2 A	new	grand	vision?		
It	remains	unclear	therefore	whether	such	structural	issues	can	be	resolved	through	
pragmatic	responses	like	the	Winter	Package,	or	whether	a	more	discontinuous	regime	
change	involving	the	formulation	of	a	new	grand	vision	will	be	required.	Most	recently,	the	
EU’s	own	energy	integration	efforts	came	together	in	the	strategy	for	a	European	Energy	
Union	(Commission,	2015),	aiming	to	integrate	European	energy	policy	in	the	areas	of	
security	of	supply,	energy	markets,	energy	efficiency,	climate	action,	and	innovation.	There	
is	uncertainty	as	to	whether	this	constitutes	a	new	grand	vision	which	coherently	integrates	
market	and	decarbonisation	objectives.	Some	recent	scholarship	has	summarised	the	
Energy	Union	as	“the	most	significant	policy	idea	that	seeks	to	reform	European	energy	
governance,	policy,	and	regional	co-operation”	(Szulecki	et	al.,	2016,	548).	Nevertheless,	
commentaries	have	also	reminded	us	to	be	cautious	of	interpreting	energy	union	as	a	
complete	overhaul	of	EU’s	energy	and	climate	policy.	Initially,	scholars	found	it	to	be	
essentially	a	new	iteration	of	familiar	problems	and	terminology	and	that	rather	than	a	
‘political’	energy	union,	the	strategy	would	result	in	a	continuation	of	the	established	
market	approach	to	European	energy	integration	(Fischer	and	Geden,	2015)(Dutton,	
2015).		At	a	time	when	Member	States	continue	to	be	reluctant	to	share	their	sovereignty	in	
energy	matters	(Judge	and	Maltby,	2017,	Thaler,	2016),	some	commentators	still	argue	that	
the	strategy	rather	aims	at	offering	incremental	improvements	to	pre-existing	European	
energy	policies	(Fisher,	2017).	
Whilst	it	is	easy	to	skeptical	about	the	boldest	promises	of	a	political	energy	union	in	the	EU,	
history	show	us	that	grand	visions	of	European	energy	integration	should	not	be	entirely	
dismissed	on	the	count	of	them	being	unrealistic.	As	we	have	shown,	they	have	been	an	
important	guide	and	coordinating	device	for	regulatory	and	market	design	processes	in	the	
past.	However,	in	a	policy	area	that	is	constantly	evolving	and	subject	to	rapid	changes,	such	
as	the	impacts	of	the	Brexit	vote	on	energy	markets,	it	is	difficult	to	determine	when	and	if	
the	Energy	Union	might	become	significant	enough	to	be	called	an	overhaul	of	existing	
policies	and	recognized	as	a	new	grand	vision.		
6 Conclusions	
In	this	paper	we	set	out	to	analyse	the	historical	development	of	Europe’s	electricity	system	
and	to	identify	tensions	between	the	current	market-based	regime	and	the	low	carbon	
transition.	Regimes,	as	defined	in	the	socio-technical	systems	literature,	are	the	rules	that	
coordinate	large	technological	systems	like	electricity	supply.	They	gain	stability	from	strong	
alignments	of	technologies	and	institutions.	We	discussed	recent	trends	in	the	literature	on	
transitions	which	analyses	the	long-term	dynamics	of	regimes,	and	how	some	in	this	field	
are	moving	away	from	ex-ante	assumptions	about	regimes	as	static	and	resistant	to	change,	
towards	a	more	symmetrical	approach	which	is	based	on	empirically	rich	accounts	of	the	
internal	dynamics	of	regimes	and	is	more	open	minded	about	the	adaptive	capacity	of	
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incumbent	actors	and	their	potential	to	innovate.	Rather	than	basing	our	analysis	on	the	
multi-level	perspective	on	transitions,	which	tends	to	focus	on	external	drivers	of	change	at	
the	landscape	and	niche	levels,	we	sought	to	develop	an	account	of	how	the	European	
electricity	regime	developed	and	evolved	over	the	decades	through	an	alignment	of	grand	
visions	and	processes	of	pragmatic	integration.	Grand	visions	embody	high	level	political	
ideals	and	economic	logics	around	European	integration	and	imply	radical	system	change.	
As	we	have	shown	for	the	case	of	the	European	electricity	system,	they	have	developed	
alongside	and	become	closely	intertwined	with	more	technical	and	pragmatic	processes	of	
system	change	which,	since	the	post-World	War	II	period,	have	tended	to	take	place	at	the	
national	level.		
We	developed	a	regime	analysis	of	Europe’s	electricity	system	and	examined	the	historical	
origins	of	European	electricity	integration.	This	became	strongly	embedded	in	the	decades	
around	the	Second	World	War.	Following	a	period	when	radically	different	visions	of	what	a	
European	system	could	be	were	proposed,	nation	states	emerged	at	the	core	of	the	system	
configuration,	but	the	idea	that	the	pursuit	of	technical	efficiencies	should	not	be	
constrained	by	territorial	borders	remained	strong	and	this	led	to	the	creation	of	
transnational	forms	of	industry	coordination	and	collaboration.	This	took	different	forms	
over	the	decades,	initially	as	a	process	of	technocratic	“hidden	integration”,	which	from	the	
late-1990s	evolved	into	a	process	of	market-led	integration.	Although	the	European	system	
did	not	develop	according	to	a	grand	vision,	in	the	sense	of	a	top-down	blueprint,	a	wider	
framing	of	a	European	system	and	the	notion	that	technical	efficiencies	should	be	pursued	
regardless	of	territorial	borders	has	endured	and	has	acted	as	a	key	guiding	vision	and	
coordinating	device	for	a	heterogeneous	set	of	actors	and	institutions.	The	shift	towards	
markets	in	recent	decades	has	not	seen	a	fundamental	change	in	this	dynamic,	rather	it	
formalised	the	rules	and	codes	for	the	previously	loosely	coordinated	regime.	Historical	
evidence	suggests	that	the	collection	of	organisations	and	institutions	which	constitute	the	
regime	of	cross-border	electricity	exchange	and	trading	in	Europe	has	shown	a	remarkable	
ability	to	adapt	and	reinvent	itself	during	different	periods	of	transition,	most	notably	
following	the	liberalisation	reforms	of	the	1990s	and	2000s	which	threatened	to	undermine	
and	dismantle	it.	
The	question	arises	today	as	to	whether	this	market-based	approach	to	integration	and	its	
associated	material	and	institutional	configuration	is	compatible	with	the	contemporary	
processes	of	low	carbon	transition.	Uncertainties	remain	as	to	how	low	carbon	technologies	
can	be	integrated	into	this	system	and	whether	this	regime	can	adapt	to	potential	
technological,	political	and	organisational	disruptions	and	dis-continuities	in	the	future.	It	is	
certainly	possible	that	these	potential	discontinuities	may	culminate	in	a	reversal	of	the	
momentum	of	the	European	electricity	market	and	integration	process.	As	it	stands,	even	
disregarding	Brexit,	the	future	of	electricity	in	Europe	is	more	likely	to	be	characterised	by	
multiple	and	differentiated	energy	transitions,	with	countries	moving	at	different	speeds	
and	maintaining	a	national	lens	as	they	develop	strategies	and	policies	in	line	with	their	own	
industrial	priorities	and	resource	bases.	The	connection	between	market	prices	and	costs	for	
electricity	generation	are	increasingly	disconnected,	thus	de-coupling	price	signals	and	
investment	decisions.	As	a	result,	the	long	term	viability	of	the	current	European	electricity	
regime	based	on	a	wholesale	market	driving	system	change	remains	unclear.		
We	propose	that	our	approach	to	socio-technical	regime	analysis	offers	useful	insights	to	
those	involved	in	contemporary	European	energy	policy	debates.	Much	of	what	has	been	
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written	about	the	EU’s	role	in	the	decarbonisation	of	European	energy	systems	examines	
the	design	and	effectiveness	of	specific	policy	measures	in	isolation	and	typically	does	not	
analyse	the	low	carbon	energy	transition	in	the	context	of	the	longer	run	trend	of	cross-
border	energy	system	integration,	a	process	which	has	been	taking	place	for	almost	a	
century.	Whether	interventions	are	aiming	at	disruptive	or	incremental	changes	to	energy	
systems,	their	success	will	be	based	on	an	understanding	of	wider	socio-technical	regimes	
which	underpin	and	provide	stability	to	systems,	otherwise	the	form	of	change	will	be	
marginal	and	superficial.	Regimes	are	contextually	embedded	and	have	quite	specific	
dynamics	and	features	which	can	only	be	uncovered	through	empirical	and	historically	
informed	analysis.		
Successful	policies	and	strategies	aimed	at	enacting	a	low	carbon	energy	transition	in	a	
European	context,	we	argue,	are	likely	to	be	the	ones	that	are	based	on	an	understanding	of	
the	dynamics	between	grand	visions	and	pragmatic	integration	processes	and	will	seek	to	
intervene	and	enact	change	at	both	of	these	levels.	We	suggest	that	what	may	be	lacking	is	
a	new	grand	vision	which	creates	a	stronger	political	consensus	around	a	European	energy	
transition	and	which	acts	as	a	coordinating	device	for	future	regulatory	changes	and	market	
designs.	Currently	these	appear	to	be	addressing	problems	as	they	arise,	as	oppose	to	
anticipating	change	and	reshaping	markets	in	a	more	strategic	way.	In	historical	terms	the	
current	period	of	uncertainty	and	apparent	openness	may	be	similar	to	the	early	inter-war	
years	when	radically	different	visions	of	what	a	European	system	might	be	seemed	possible.	
History	shows	us	that	there	is	no	one	vision	of	a	European	system,	whether	based	on	
economic	logics,	political	ideals	or	technological	utopianism.	
In	the	wider	field	of	transition	studies	further	work	would	be	required	to	develop	these	
insights	about	European	energy	policy	and	system	change.	This	should	focus	on	more	in-
depth	studies	of	regimes;	in	particular,	the	nature,	origins	and	evolution	of	the	detailed	
technical	rules,	procedures	and	codes	by	which	they	operate.	An	adapted	version	of	our	
framework	of	grand	visions	and	pragmatic	integration	might	serve	as	a	basis	for	this	as	it	
links	these	internal	technical	features	of	regimes	with	wider	political	and	social	processes,	
without	straying	too	far	from	the	key	unit	of	analysis.	The	continual	broadening	of	transition	
studies	as	an	academic	field,	we	argue,	risks	diluting	its	original	contribution	–	the	
understanding	of	socio-technical	regimes	and	their	long	term	evolution.	The	symmetrical	
approach	to	regime	analysis	developed	here	seems	to	fit	well	with	a	transnational	regime	
such	as	European	electricity	which	is	very	heterogeneous	and	relatively	loosely	coordinated,	
but	it	may	not	be	the	case	for	those	embedded	at	the	national	or	sub-national	scales	which	
may	in	fact	be	more	ridged	and	resistant	to	change.	Whatever	the	case,	any	claims	about	
the	nature	and	dynamics	of	regimes	in	transition	studies	should	be	based	on	historically	
informed	empirical	analysis.	
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